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Radicales islámicos en Brasil

Cable sobre la estrategia brasileña de Defensa

En enero de 2009 la Embaja alaba la pretensión de Brasil de insertar al sector militar en el desarrollo nacional

ID:186498
Date:2009-01-09 17:09:00
Origin:09BRASILIA35
Source:Embassy Brasilia
Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:08BRASILIA93 09BRASILIA34
Destination:VZCZCXRO3519
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0035/01 0091709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091709Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3273
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8903
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7087
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3329
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000035

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: BR, PREL, MARR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S DEFENSE STRATEGY -- MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS

REF: A. BRASILIA 34
B. 08 BRASILIA 93

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason: 1.5 (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Ref a reported on the strategic aspects of
Brazil,s new Defense Strategy document, signed by President
Lula on December 18. While the main purpose of the strategy
as written by the Minister for Strategic Planning, was to
place Brazil,s military and defense sector in the framework
of a broader vision of national development (reported in ref
a), the document also contains policy guidance for the
Defense Ministry and the three services that give a clearer
view of how Defense Minister Jobim and senior military
leaders see these institutions developing over the next
generation -- into a more flexible, modern force with joint
operational capabilities. The restructuring of the Brazilian
military can be seen as a compromise between setting
conditions for a its role in a broader plan for national
development and the goal of having a modern, effective
military. After more than twenty years outside the political
mainstream, and twenty years of minimal resources, the
Brazilian military is now making a case for its
modernization. As it does so, opportunities will exist for
improving the U.S.-Brazil security partnership. END SUMMARY.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
-------------------
2. (SBU) In its nine-year history, the Brazilian Ministry
of Defense has been under resourced and has had difficulty in
providing effective civilian control over the armed forces.
The Defense Strategy seeks to ameliorate this situation by
calling for the employment of better-prepared civilian
Ministry officials in place of some of the military personnel
who now predominate. The Ministry will have the lead on
developing implementing arrangements for the Defense Strategy
and is tasked with issuing instructions for the activities of
the Armed Forces during peacetime. The Strategy also
recognizes the importance of the Armed Forces becoming more
"joint" in their operational capabilities and tasks the
Ministry with encouraging more inter-service cooperation. As
noted in ref a, sources in the Defense Ministry and Ministry
for External Affairs told Embassy personnel that a principal
reason for the delay in final approval of the strategy was to
ensure inclusion of the services, comments. As the section
on each service differs markedly in terms of focus and style
from the others, it is likely that the interagency agreement
reached to allow the strategy document to go forward was to
add in services, submissions to the document. The chapters
on the services all seek to make a case for increased
resources and modernized equipment but are not always
successful at spelling out the strategic vision for the
potential security threats or contingencies to which many of
the desired upgrades would respond.

NAVY
----
3. (C) The Navy is tasked with control of the seas and
rivers and denying their use to potential adversaries. Its
main tasks will be defense of oil facilities and ports and
assistance against transnational criminals. COMMENT: There
is, however, no information as to what possible threats to
oil facilities the Navy may be asked to counter, making it
difficult, for example to evaluate the strategy,s assertion
that a nuclear submarine would be necessary to meet the goal
of protecting such facilities. END COMMENT. The strategy
does recommend increased Navy capabilities in two key areas:
control of the rivers and power projection in support of
peacekeeping. Noting that lack of effective control of the
Amazon and Parana river systems undermines stability, the
Navy will seek more brown water assets, including patrol
vessels and better reconnaissance capability. While
Brazil,s current peacekeeping effort is focused on Haiti,
there is an acknowledgement that Brazil will have to take a
great share of the global burden and should be able to deploy
and support peacekeepers out of its immediate region.

4. (C) The Navy,s wish list for equipment includes the
expected nuclear powered submarines. (See ref b for
discussion.) The Navy also seeks patrol craft and air patrol
capabilities that will be important to effective monitoring
of coasts and river systems. Naval aviation is set to

BRASILIA 00000035 002 OF 003


improve through acquisition of aircraft and aircraft
carriers, although the strategy specifies that any naval
aircraft should be produced in Brazil. Finally, the Navy is
charged with improving its search and rescue capabilities,
including the potential for international cooperation.

ARMY
----
5. (C) The Army,s strategic instructions focus on
restructuring to make the force more mobile and able to
engage in non-traditional conflicts. To this end, the Army
plans to shift to a brigade model in order to have more
deployable units available. These "rapid action forces" are
intended to give commanders the ability to react to crises in
remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities that can be
tailored to the situation. In support of such missions, the
Army,s acquisition priorities will be improved
reconnaissance and communications, helicopters, night vision
and fire control technology.

6. (C) While mentioned prominently elsewhere in the Defense
Strategy, the Army chapter does not, unlike the other
services, raise the possibility of additional peacekeeping
operations as a future mission, possibly a reflection of the
Army,s frustration with the lack of an exit strategy in
Haiti. The Army,s planning is also silent on the major new
task it will have in training up to three million potential
reservists per year should the strategy,s national service
provisions be fully implemented.

AIR FORCE
---------
7. (C) Apart from the highly prescriptive section on
fighter procurement discussed in ref a, the Air Force chapter
focuses on how to meet challenges in joint operations,
reconnaissance and communications. The Air Force,s highest
priority, aside from new fighters, will be on acquiring more
airlift capability so that one of the Army,s new brigades
can be deployed rapidly at any time. Other priorities
include UAVs and improved satellite capability, particularly
through indigenous space launch. These priorities are
underlined by a clear directive to favor domestic industry
where possible. The capability to build aircraft (including
UAVs and space launch vehicles) in Brazil is considered "so
important as to transcend discussions of equipment," a policy
of sacrificing capability in favor of domestic production.

COMMENTS
--------
8. (C) As with the rest of the Defense Strategy, the
sections on restructuring of the Brazilian military are a
compromise between setting conditions for a military role in
a broader plan for national development and the goal of
having a modern, effective military. After more than twenty
years outside the political mainstream, and twenty years of
minimal resources, the Brazilian military is now making a
case for its modernization. Making the case, however, means
that the Defense Strategy must observe the conventional
wisdom of Brazilian politics. There is no threat, for
example, to Brazil,s maritime oil deposits, but Brazilian
leaders and media have routinely cited oil discoveries off
the coast as an urgent reason for better maritime security.
This concern has been merged with Brazil,s twenty year quest
to develop a nuclear submarine to give new impetus to
research on a small reactor for naval propulsion. While the
Army chapter of the strategy includes the seemingly mandatory
caution about being prepared to protect Brazil,s sovereignty
against a country or group of countries acting "on pretext of
the supposed interests of humanity," it remains primarily
focused on more realistic security challenges. The political
preoccupation with imagined threats to sovereignty in the
Amazon, however, serves the practical purpose of tasking the
military with developing greater capabilities to project
power into the region most likely to be affected by
instability in neighboring countries.

9. (C) A Brazilian military that is more capable and
deployable can support U.S. interests by exporting stability
in Latin America and be available for peacekeeping elsewhere.
The plans by the Brazilian services, as evidenced in those
parts of the defense strategy likely contributed by the
services, are consistent with this interest, and, if

BRASILIA 00000035 003 OF 003


implemented, will lead to Brazil becoming a more effective
security partner. There are however, serious questions as to
how much of these plans will see follow through, particularly
with other supposed strategic priorities, including national
service, nuclear submarines and government support to
non-competitive defense industries, providing black holes to
suck in all available resources.
SOBEL
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